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The European Commission’s decision in July 2001 to prohibit the proposed merger between
General Electric and Honeywell1 has been the starting point of the ﬁerce debate between
the European and the U.S. competition authorities on the theory of “portfolio power” or
“range eﬀects” in conglomerate mergers.
This “portfolio power” approach has ﬁrst been introduced in 1996-97 by the European
Commission in three major merger cases.2 It is worth noting that the U.S. authorities
already rejected this theory at that time. One of the conclusions in the Guinness / Grand
Metropolitan case (hereafter GMG) was that, despite the lack of increase in market share in
some individual product markets, the existence of such a portfolio may create or strengthen
a dominant position.3 The GMG decision clearly deﬁnes some of the beneﬁts that the holder
of a comprehensive portfolio may enjoy: economies of scale and scope in marketing activities,
stronger position vis-` a-vis its customers (the seller now accounts for a larger proportion of
the buyer’s turnover), and greater potential for tying or other bundling techniques. As
denoted by Giotakos (1998), “the anti-competitive likelihood of portfolio eﬀects is based on
the proposition that the combined portfolio of products/brands of the merged ﬁrm represents
an essential facility for the downstream agents in a manner that the individual product lines
of the undertakings pre-merger did not”. The holder of a complete line of products could
for example impose exclusive contracts on the retailers or force them to buy the complete
line (full-line forcing). The anti-competitive eﬀects of this behavior are twofold. Firstly, the
portfolio can be used to “reposition relatively weaker brands within the portfolio against the
brands of the competitors at the same level of quality”. In other words, the holder of the
portfolio can try to impose brands that the retailer would otherwise not be willing to buy.
The second aspect is the possible foreclosure eﬀect. The complete range of products can be
used to take up more space on the retailers’ shelves in order to limit the space available to
competitors and force them out of the market. This paper focuses on this second aspect.
The Commission’s argument have been widely criticized. In its contribution to an OECD
Best Practices Roundtable,4 the U.S. Department of Justice made it clear that they did not
believe in this theory and that they were “very concerned that the range eﬀects theory of
competitive injury that is gaining currency in certain jurisdictions places the interests of com-
petitors ahead of those of consumers and will lead to blocking or deterring pro-competitive,
1See Giotakos et al. (2001) for a detailled presentation of the GE / Honeywell decision.
2Coca-Cola / Amalgamated Beverages (case IV/M.796), Coca-Cola / Carlsberg (case IV/M.833) and
Guinness / Grand Metropolitan (case IV/M.938).
3We will discuss in greater details the GMG case in the last section of the paper . Other possible sources
of “portfolio power” have been identiﬁed by the European Commission in these cases: see Lexecon (1998)
and OECD (2002) for a more comprehensive presentation of this theory.
4See OECD (2002).
2eﬃciency-enhancing mergers.” In its competition memo on the GMG case, Lexecon (1998)
show the same scepticism: “In its current form, the portfolio power approach is made up of
a number of disparate ideas which are not supported by a unifying economic theory.”
It has to be acknowledged, that although there exists a thorough literature on the eﬀects
of tying and bundling of complementary products, the economic theory of “portfolio power”
in the case of portfolio of substitutable products (such as in GMG) is fairly limited. Rabassa
(1999) is to our knowledge the ﬁrst and only attempt: she shows that when quality is a short
run decision variable and therefore producers are able to modify the quality of their products
after a merger, mergers increase the breath of the portfolio may have anti-competitive eﬀects.
She also shows that the post-merger market share of the new ﬁrm is higher than the pre-
merger combined market share of the merging parties, thereby conﬁrming the theory that
a wider portfolio creates sur-additivity. However, her analysis is limited to the case of
producers directly selling their products to ﬁnal consumers, whereas the “portfolio theory”
has usually be applied to situations in which manufacturers sell their ranges of products
through retailers rather than to ﬁnal consumers who might be interested to buy one of the
products only.
This paper does not try to provide a unifying economic theory of “portfolio eﬀects” but
attempts to oﬀer a new insight (and wants to “add a stone to the creation” of this uniﬁed
theory). The objective of this paper is to show that a ﬁrm may acquire a comprehensive
range of products (even if the addition to the original portfolio does not seem interesting in
the short-term) with the view to impose to the retailer to buy its complete range of products
in order to deter entry. The idea is that a ﬁrm that enjoys monopoly power on one market
may want to “invade” the retailer’s shelves in order to ensure that entry on the monopolized
market cannot occur because consumers never have any opportunity to discover new brands.
As we will show this strategy is best implemented when the ﬁrm can oﬀer the full range of
product and impose vertical restraints (full-line forcing in our case).
This paper relates more or less closely to three strands of literature. Firstly, the model
we propose is closely inspired by Shaﬀer (1991) and Verg´ e (2001). Shaﬀer (1991) provides
a ﬁrst attempt to analyze full-line forcing in a vertical relationship between a multi-product
monopolist and a unique retailer. He shows that the upstream monopolist will have incentives
to sell the two products under a unique contract (full-line forcing) in order to eliminate
the rent that the retailer can obtain due to its ability to select the products it carries.
Verg´ e (2001) shows that in Shaﬀer’s setting full-line forcing has also a positive impact on
consumer surplus because it reduces price distortions. In this model, we will introduce
perfect competition on the tied market. This ensures that the retailer’s rent is now ﬁxed
and we therefero eliminate any incentives to for the tying -market monopolist to produce
both goods. There would therefore be no incentives in our setting to hold a comprehensive
3portfolio of brand and to tie their sales if there was no threat of entry. We will then show
how these incentives can be modiﬁed if an entrant can threatened the incumbent’s monopoly
power.
Our analysis is also related to the dynamic leverage theory. Following a long (and still
ongoing) debate on the credibility of the leverage theory of tying,5 a strand of literature
mostly inspired by the Microsoft case has developed on the dynamic eﬀects of tying (dynamic
leveraging). The idea is that a ﬁrm which has monopoly power on one market may want
to reduce competition on a related market in order to protect its monopoly power in the
t y i n gm a r k e to rt oe x t e n di tt ot h et i e dm a r k e t . T h i st h e o r yh a sﬁrst been developed by
Nalebuﬀ (1999, 2000). Tying might now be harmful for the buyers because it limits the
proﬁtability of entry and thus reduces competition in the long term. A similar argument
has been developed by Carlton and Waldman (2002). The basic framework is one in which
a ﬁrm has monopoly power on two complementary markets but faces a threat of entry
on one market at each period of the game. If the monopoly ties-in the sales of its two
components it can prevent entry in both market and preserve its monopoly position: the
idea is that entry can be proﬁtable only if a ﬁrm is able to enter in both market at the
same time since one component alone has no value for the consumers.6 In a similar way
to Carlton and Waldman, we assume that entry occurs ﬁrst on the potentially tied market
before occurring on the monopolized market. This plays a critical role in our model: the idea
is that consumers are always sceptical when they see new products and prefer to stick with
the well-known brands. A newcomer must therefore start in a highly-competitive market
before being able to gain reputation and compete with the established brand. If signalling
is impossible the incumbent may want to prevent entry in the “tied” market in order to
maintain its monopoly position. Our model however departs from the standard literature on
tying / bundling in that we consider imperfectly substitutable goods that can be consumed
in variable proportions.
Finally, this paper could also be related to the literature on entry deterrence. The idea
is that the holder of a comprehensive portfolio of brands will use that portfolio to impose
barriers to entry through full-line forcing. By “ﬂooding” the retailer’s shelves, the incumbent
will make it impossible for the entrant to have to the consumers.7 Although the idea is that
established brand owner have a substantial advantage on the producer of a new brand who
needs to acquire a reputation, our model is however diﬀerent from the advertising models
such as Schmalensee (1982) or from limit pricing models such as Milgrom and Roberts (1982)
5See Whinston (1990) for an extensive presentation of the debate.
6Using a similar framework, Choi and Stefanidis (2001) shows that tying reduces the incentives for
innovation thereby protecting the monopolist position. The main idea is that if the incumbent ties the sales
of the two complementary goods, a new comer now need to successfully enter both market.
7Our model diﬀers from Schmalensee (1978) in that the incumbent “ﬂoods” the market by increasing the
quantity rather than the number of brands it sells.
4in the sense that everybody (including the ﬁrms) is uncertain about the chances of success
of a new comer and there is no room for signalling.8 Entry deterrence in our model will
be achieved through the contract oﬀered by the incumbent to the retailer. Although it is
similar to what happens in Aghion and Bolton (1987), it does not occur because of the
uncertainty but because full-line forcing makes entry more costly. However, the intuition is
similar in that entry cannot always be deterred because the incumbent needs to compensate
the retailer because it would beneﬁt from entry.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we present the features of our dynamic
model with threat of entry. Once we have analyzed the possible second period equilibria
(section 3), we analyze the rationale for full-line forcing and the role of a comprehensive
portfolio of products (section 4). In particular we show that this portfolio of products can
be used to deter entry (through the use of vertical restraints) and this may happen to the
detriment of the consumers. We then discuss the robustness of the analysis suggesting how
our modelling assumptions could be relaxed (section 5). Finally, section 6 presents some
implications of the model for competition authorities and concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Goods and Consumers
We consider an economy in which two imperfectly substitutable varieties of a good are
available. We further assume that the two varieties are vertically diﬀerentiated and we will
hereafter denote them H and L and refer to them as the high-value and low-value varietyies
respectively.9 The inverse demand functions are denoted PH (qH,q L)a n dPL (qH,q L), and
given that the two varieties are imperfect substitutes, these functions are decreasing in both
qH and qL.
Let us denote by π (qH,q L;wH,w L)t h ep r o ﬁt that a monopolist producing the two va-
rieties at constant marginal costs wH and wL would realize if it sells quantities qH and qL,
that is:
π(qH,q L;wH,w L)=( PH (qH,q L) − wH)qH +( PL (qH,q L) − wL)qL.
We assume that, for any value of wH and wL,t h i sp r o ﬁt function is strictly concave in (qH,q L)
and reaches its maximum for a unique pair of quantities, qM
H (wH,w L)a n dqM
L (wH,w L). We
8See Vickers (1985) for a comprehensive presentation of the diﬀerent theories of entry deterrence under
uncertainty and asymmetric information.
9Vertically diﬀerentiation is assumed for exposition purposes only. The value of a product can for example
be related to its intrinsic or perceived quality.
5also denote by pM
H (wH,w L)a n dpM
L (wH,w L) the corresponding prices, and by πM(wH,w L)
the proﬁt made by that hypothetical monopolist. Due to the concavity assumption, qM
i
(i = H,L) is decreasing in wi and increasing in wj (j 6= i), whereas the proﬁt πM (wH,w L)
is a decreasing function of wH and wL.
If the production cost of one variety (let say wL) is too high, or if the producer cannot
propose it, it maximizes
π(qH,0;wH,w L)=( PH (qH,0) − wH)qH.
Under our assumption, this is a concave function of qH and we continue to assume that it
reaches its maximum for a unique value of qH. We will denote by qM
H (wH,∅) this optimal
quantity, by pM
H (wH,∅) the price at which it is sold and by πM
H (wH,∅) the corresponding
proﬁt. qM
L (∅,w L),p M
L (∅,w L)a n dπM
L (∅,w L)a r ed e ﬁned in a similar way.10
We moreover assume that the inverse demand functions are such that the prices pM
H (wH,w L)
and pM
L (wH,w L) are increasing function of wH and wL.11
2.2 Firms
The production sector consists of three types of ﬁrms, all of them operating under constant
returns to scale.
• Competitive Producers (“Fringe”)
Perfectly substitutable manufacturers produce the low-quality variety (L)a tm a r g i n a l
cost c.
• Incumbent (I)
The incumbent manufacturer I produces a high-quality variety (H)a tm a r g i n a lcI >c .
It is assumed that it is more costly to produce quality H because it involves either
more sophisticated ingredients or more costly packaging or advertising.
The incumbent manufacturer can also acquire the technology to produce the low-
value variety (L) at zero cost. One such possibility is to merge with a competitive
manufacturer. We thus assume that the incumbent then produces that variety at
marginal cost c.
• Entrant (E)
Manufacturer E produces a “new” brand at marginal cost c ≤ cE ≤ cI. We describe
the entrant product’s type and the entry process in the next subsection.
10Notice that in these cases we have: qM
L (wH,∅)=qM
H (∅,w L) = 0 and the prices pM
L (wH,∅)a n d
pM
H (∅,w L) are irrelevant.
11The costs wH and wL can take any value including ∅ (∅ stands for the absence of the product and
corresponds to very high values of the production cost).
6The producers do not have direct access to the ﬁnal consumers and have to sell their
products through a monopolist retailer.12 Marginal distribution costs are assumed to be
constant and we will, without loss of generality, normalize them to 0. In addition, we consider
that shelf space is a scarce resource and assume that the retailer can carry at most two
diﬀerent products.13 The manufacturer thus have to compete in order to gain access to this
essential facility. There seem to be some evidence that access to retailers’ shelves is a crucial
issue for most manufacturers who usually have to pay large slotting allowances to ensure
that retailers will consider selling their products.14 We can see several justiﬁcations for this
speciﬁc constraint on the number of products proposed by a retailer: ﬁrstly, if there is a ﬁxed
cost to carry a product in the shelves, the number of products that a retailer chooses to carry
will necessarily be limited. This will for example be the case if proposing a product in the
shelves is associated with some “marketing” activities that are independent of the number
of units actually sold.15 A similar interpretation in terms of opportunity costs was suggested
in Shaﬀer (1991). We could also imagine that a product will be attractive to comsumers
only it is put in evidence in the shelves. This means that a product would be “visible” (or
catch the consumers eyes) only if a suﬃciently large quantity of the product is presented in
the shelves. This in turn implies that the number of products that a retailer can carry is
limited.16
2.3 Timing
We analyze a two-period game in which the sequence of events is identical for both periods.
The two periods however diﬀer with respect to the existing competition on the market for
each variety of the good. We will ﬁrst present the sequence of oﬀe r sc o m m o nt ob o t hp e r i o d s
12The assumption that there exists only one retailer might seem restrictive. It is however commonly
observed that the food retailing sector is fairly concentrated in Europe (see Dobson Consulting (1999)). It
would thus be interesting to extend the model to an oligopolistic retail sector, but this would signiﬁcantly
complicate the analysis given that diﬀerent retailers would then be able to oﬀer diﬀerent lines of products
(see for example Champsaur and Rochet (1989) or Gilbert and Matutes (1993) for such issues in models
without the threat of entry). Considering a monopolized sector is therefore a way to keep the analysis simple
while allowing for buyer power.
13In what follows, we will call product a combination of a quality (H or L)a n dabrand name (manufac-
turer). From the point of view of the consumers two products of the same quality (therefore produced by
two diﬀerent manufacturers) are perfectly substitutable.
14See Dobson Consulting (1999) for a comprehensive analysis of the food retailing industry in the European
Union.
15We can for example think of advertising or in-store promotional activities to increase the visibility of
the product.
16Notice that if the contracts signed with the manufacturers include buy-back guarantee this assumption
simply limits the number of products proposed in the shelves but does not require to actually pay for a
minimum number of units.
7and then describe the market structure (i.e. the entry process) in each period.
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that the two periods carry equal weight, that
is, there is no discounting.
2.3.1 Sequence of Oﬀers
The sequence of the events is the same for both periods:
(a) The incumbent producer I makes take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the retailer.
(b) The entrant E and the competitive producers make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the
retailer.17
(c) The retailer accepts or rejects each oﬀer. For each product it has accepted to carry,
it then decides the quantity to be sold on the retail market and relevant contracts are
enforced.
Each oﬀer made by the entrant or by a competitive producer is a two-part tariﬀ (w,F),
where F is a ﬁxed fee paid by the retailer in order to be allowed to resell the product and a
per unit price w.18
The incumbent can decide to sell the high-value variety only or to sell both varieties (if
its technology allows it to do so). If it oﬀers the variety H only, the oﬀer is then a two-part
tariﬀ (wH,F H). If it sells both varieties, the incumbent can either sell the two products
separately and thus oﬀers two variety-speciﬁc two-part tariﬀs( ( wL,F L)a n d( wH,F H)), or
sell them under a unique contract (wH,w L,F HL)c o n s i s t i n go fau n i q u eﬁx e df e ea n dap e r
unit wholesale price for each product (full-line forcing).
All oﬀers are publicly observable.
2.3.2 Entry Process
The good we consider is an experience, in the sense the consumer do not know the value
of a product if they have not tested in some way. Consumers are assumed to be extremely
risk-averse when they try a new product and to have a strong bias against new comers.
One justiﬁcation for this bias can be the following: a large number of ﬁrms can acquire the
technology to produce a low-value brand, but only the incumbent ﬁrm has yet managed to
acquire a good reputation on the market. Consumers will then be extremely cautious when a
17Assuming that oﬀers are made simultaneously would lead to multiple equilibria, and our equilibrium
would then correspond to the most favourable equilibrium for the incumbent. Selecting any other equilibrium
would simply reinfor ce the “portfolio eﬀect” presented in the next sections.
18We allow for negative franchise fees in which case the producer pays to have its product in the retailer’s
shelves (“slotting allowance”).
8new ﬁrm enters the market. The actual “type” (or variety) of the product can be discovered
through consumption but can also be spread around by word of mouth or by consumer
associations (as long as people “spreading the news” - word of mouth or associations - have
tested the product).
When the entrant’s product is introduced nobody is able to tell whether it is likely to be
a success or not. However, the ﬁrms (all manufacturers and the retailer) know with which
probability this product will be success. Nobody knows the “actual” variety of the entrant’s
product before the end of the ﬁrst period (when uncertainty is resolved). It is therefore
impossible for the ﬁrms to signal the type to consumers who can only discover it through
consumption or word of mouth. The “entry process” will thus be the following:
• In the ﬁrst period, consumers are extremely cautious and, if the entrant’s product
is present on the retailer’s shelves, they consider it as a perfect substitute for the
low-value variety (type L).
• If the product is not present in the shelves during the ﬁrst period, or if nobody has
bought it during this period, nobody has any chance to discover the “actual” type and
the entrant’s product will continue to be seen as a low-value product in the second
period.
• If the product has been sold in the ﬁrst period, then consumers who have bought
the product “learn” its type. Moreover these consumers can spread the news to all
other consumers so that all consumers are now informed. We are assuming here that
information can be transmitted through consumers reviews or tests very quickly. This
might seem an extreme case, but it can be reasonable to assume that with the rapid
expansion of the internet, access to information is now relatively easy. We assume that
consumers will like the product with probability p. If consumers like it, entry is said
to have been successful and, in the second period, the entrant’s product is a perfect
substitute for the incumbent’s high-value variety. Otherwise, entry has failed and the
second period is identical to the ﬁrst period.
We furthermore assume that consumers are myopic.19
3 Second Period Equilibrium
The second period corresponds to a static situation in which producers are selling their
products through a common agent. Competition is nevertheless aﬀected by the type (quality)
19Some of the assumptions presented in this section might seem very strong. Rather than discussing them
at this stage, we made the choice to present the results and the intuitions with this framework and only then
discuss the robustness of the results.
9of the diﬀerent products, that is, it depends on whether entry has been successful or not in
the ﬁrst period. We can summarize the situation as follows.
• If entry has been successful: the entrant and the incumbent’s high-value variety
are perfect substitutes. There is then some degree of competition on both markets
(low- and high-value).
• If entry has failed or did not occur: the incumbent is a monopoly on the high-value
market whereas the low-value market is competitive.
In what follows we will assume that the marginal costs and the demand functions satisfy
the following conditions:
(H1): ∀cE ∈ [c,cI], the quantities qM
H (cE,c), qM
L (cE,c),q M
H (cI,c E), qM
L (cI,c E) are strictly
positive.
These conditions imply that qM
H (cE,∅)a n dqM
L (∅,c E) are positive. The ﬁrst two condi-
tions are relatively natural since they ensure that the varieties are viable whichever manu-
facturer is producing them. The last two are made for sake of simplicity but are not essential
and do not aﬀect the results.
3.1 Entry failed
Assume ﬁrst that entry has failed or did not even occur (i.e. the entrant’s product was not
available on the retailer’s shelves). The incumbent thus maintains its monopoly position on
the market for high-quality and, since the entrant is less eﬃcient than the producers of the
fringe for the low-value product (cE ≥ c), it will leave the market. This situation is thus
very similar to Shaﬀer (1991) except that the low-value is perfectly competitive.
Everything thus happens as if the retailer were able to produce the low-value variety
itself at cost c. It can then decide to reject the wholesale contract oﬀered by the incumbent,
sell the low-value product only and secure a proﬁte q u a lt oπM (∅,c).
The incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the retailer to sell its high-value variety
and possibly its low-value variety . Since the incumbent makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer and
can oﬀer a two-part tariﬀ, it is able to recover the total industry proﬁt through the ﬁxed
fee, except for the minimal secured proﬁt πM (∅,c). The best the incumbent can do is thus
to ensure that the retailer charges prices that maximize the total industry proﬁt. This leads
to the following lemma:20
20In what follows, the subscripts I, E and R refer to the incumbent, the entrant and the retailer respec-
tively.
10Lemma 1 If entry did not occur or failed, the second period equilibrium is such that the
incumbent manufacturer I charges wholesale price(s) equal to the marginal production cost(s)











Because the low-quality market is perfectly competitive it is pointless for the incumbent
to produce such this variety.21 Without the threat of entry, the acquisition of a low-quality
producer would have no impact on prices and proﬁts.
3.2 Entry was successful
Suppose now entry has occurred and was successful, that is, it was revealed that the en-
trant’s product is of high quality (or value). This product is now a perfect substitute for the
incumbent’s high-value variety. Moreover, the entrant is more eﬃcient than the incumbent
at producing the high-quality and will thus be the only active ﬁrm on that market. How-
ever price competition between the two ﬁrms reduces their bargaining position vis-` a-vis the
retailer, even though they are able to make take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers to the downstream ﬁrm.
T h er e t a i l e ri st h e r e f o r ea b l et os e c u r eap r o ﬁte q u a lt oπM (cI,c).22
The entrant will therefore ensure that the retailer charges the industry maximizing prices
(by selling its product at marginal cost) amd charge the highest fee such that its product is
carried by the retailer. These results are summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 2 If entry has been successful, the second period equilibrium is such that the entrant
charges a wholesale price equal to its marginal product cost and sets a ﬁxed fee such that the
second period proﬁts are:
π
2
I (S)=0 , π
2
E (S)=π
M (cE,c) − π




21This allows us to focus on the potential anti-competitive eﬀects in isolation and get rid of the possible
welfare improving eﬀects of full-line forcing when used to limit the retailer’s ability to select the products it
carries (see Verg´ e (2001)).
22To be selected by the retailer, the entrant has to make an oﬀer which is attractive even if the incumbent
is ready to sell its high-value variety at cost. Notice here that we consider only “cautious equilibria” in which
the oﬀer made by the incumbent is such that it would lead to non-negative proﬁt if it was accepted.
114 Portfolio Power and Entry-Deterrence
4.1 Incentives to Deter Entry
Let us ﬁrst look at the impact of active entry (the entrant’s product is actually sold during
the ﬁrst period: q1





i (S)+( 1− p)π
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T h i ss h o w st h a ta sl o n ga st h ec o s td i ﬀerential cI−cE is not too high, the incumbent I has
more to lose than the entrant has to gain.23 This could create incentives for the incumbent
to deter entry. However as we will see, the existence of a monopolist retailer makes it more
diﬃcult to achieve (at least proﬁtably) because the retailer also beneﬁts from entry.
4.2 First Period Equilibrium
4.2.1 Equilibrium without Portfolio Power
Let us ﬁrst assume that the incumbent produces only the high-value variety (H). Because,
successful entry introduces competition on the high-value segment and thus increases its
second period proﬁt, the retailer has strong incentives to favor entry. The retailer might
be tempted to carry the entrant’s product rather than one of the competitively produced
low-value brands even if this decreases its ﬁrst period proﬁt. Options for the incumbent are
therefore limited:
(i) Either it decides to “accommodate entry” and maximizes its short term proﬁth o p i n g
that entry will not be successful;
(ii) or it distorts its ﬁrst period proﬁts in order to deter entry and maintain its monopoly
position for sure.
In what follows we make the following assumption:
(H2): p
¡
πM (cE,c) − πM (∅,c)
¢
≥ πM (∅,c) − πM (∅,c E). This imposes that either the en-
trant’s cost advantage (relative to the incumbent) is large enough (the right-hand
term goes to 0 when cE goes to c) or that the probability that entry succeeds is high
enough.
23This will always be the case if cI and c are such that 2πM (cI,c) > πM (∅,c)+πM (0,c) .
12The following lemma shows that under assumption (H2), it will never be possible for the
incumbent to deter entry (without portfolio power). This assumption is not essential for the
result, but it allows us to focus on the anti-competitive motives for the acquisition of the
low-quality variety.
Lemma 3 If it produces the high-value variety only, the incumbent can never deter entry.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Although the entrant is less eﬃcient
than the competitive producers (on the low-value segment), the expected increase of joints
proﬁts of the pair entrant - retailer compensates any possible ﬁrst period loss thereby making
entry deterrence impossible.
Because the incumbent cannot deter entry, the ﬁrst period situation is a standard common
agency problem in which the incumbent and the entrant deal with the same retailer to reach
the ﬁnal consumers. Wholesale prices are therefore set to marginal costs (wH = cI and
wL = cE) in order to maximize industry proﬁts, and each retailer sets its franchise fee in
order to ensure that the retailer will accept its contract in addition to the competitor’s
contract. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If the incumbent produces only the high-value variety, the incumbent and the
entrant charge wholesale prices equal to their respective marginal production costs (cI and cE)
and the franchise fees are
FI = π
M(cI,c E) − π









The incumbent’s total proﬁti st h e r e f o r e :
πI (L)=π
M(cI,c E) − π







Proof. See Appendix B.
This situation is a standard common agency problem except that the existence of the
c o m p e t i t i v ef r i n g e( w h i c hi sm o r ee ﬃcient than the entrant on the low-value segment) limits
the maximum ﬁxed fee the entrant can set. The incumbent I makes the ﬁrst oﬀer and
therefore obtains a proﬁt equal to the proﬁt generated by its product, whereas the entrant
has to compensate the retailer for the loss incurred in the ﬁrst period.
134.2.2 Portfolio Power and Full-line Forcing
Assume now that the incumbent produces both varieties. Given that the incumbent is not
more eﬃcient than any of the competitive producers on the low-value segment, the only
interest of proposing this product is to sell it jointly with the high-value variety and ﬁll the
two slots available in the retailer’s shelves. It is then straightforward to see that this is best
done when the incumbent oﬀers a unique tariﬀ (wH,w L,F H + FL).24
If the incumbent makes a unique oﬀer, it has to ensure that the retailer is willing to
accept it even if the entrant is ready to give its technology to the distributor for free. In











Once again, the incumbent can recover the industry proﬁt minus this secured proﬁt πR
through the franchise fee. It will therefore set wholesale prices equal to its marginal costs,
and charge a franchise fee such that
π













M (∅,c E) − p
¡
π




If the incumbent decides to produce both varieties in order to deter entry, its proﬁti s :
πI (H + L)=2 π
M(cI,c) − π








In order to decide whether to force the retailer to buy its complete line of products or to
accommodate entry, the incumbent compares πI(H + L) with the proﬁt πI(L)g i v e nb y
proposition 1. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The incumbent decides to produce both varieties in order to deter entry
whenever entry would decrease total industry proﬁts, that is, when cE ≥ b cE where c<b cE <c I
is the unique solution of:
π








24The producer can indeed replicate the equilibrium generated with the two contracts (wH,F H)a n d
(wL,F L), by oﬀering the unique tariﬀ (wH,w L,F H + FL). Moreover, as shown by Shaﬀer (1991), full-line
forcing reduces the rent that a multi-product ﬁrm needs to leave to the retailer.
14Proof. The two proﬁts the incumbent compares are:
πI(H + L)=2 π
M(cI,c) − π
M (∅,c E) − π
M (cE,c)
and πI(L)=π
M(cI,c E) − π
M(∅,c E).
We thus have:
πI(H + L) ≥ πI(L) ⇔ π
M (cI,c) − π
M (cI,c E) ≥ p
¡
π




The left-hand term of the inequality is the short term beneﬁt generated by entry deterrence
(because the low-value variety is produce more eﬃciently by the incumbent than the entrant),
and is an increasing function of cE. The right-hand term is the expected increase in industry
proﬁt generated by entry and is a decreasing function of cE. Moreover, this inequality is not
satisﬁed for cE = c but is satisﬁed for cE = cI.
The ownership of a comprehensive portfolio of varieties creates incentives for full-line
forcing and allows the holder of such portfolio to strategically deter entry to maintain its
monopoly position on the high-quality market.
When it only produces the high-value variety, the incumbent cannot deter entry, because
the retailer always has incentives to resell the entrant’s product (at least an inﬁnitesimal
quantity) in order to increase its second period expected proﬁt. Full-line forcing reinforces
the incumbent’s bargaining position. In order to sell the entrant’s product, the retailer has
now to reject the incumbent joint oﬀer. In this case, it forsakes the opportunity of proposing
the high-quality variety on its shelves and thus forsakes the associated ﬁrst period proﬁts.
However, if the entrant is suﬃciently eﬃcient, the gain from successful entry is large enough
tp compensate the reduction in short term proﬁt. In that case, it would be too expensive for
the incumbent to deter entry. But as the entrant’s cost advantage decreases, entry deterrence
(through full-line forcing) becomes a more attractive strategy.
This result is similar to Aghion and Bolton (1987) in the sense that the incumbent must
make sure that the retailer is compensated for any potential loss created by entry deterrence.
Here, the incumbent cannot set clauses in the contract to compensate the retailer in case
they decide to breach the agreement (they only sign short-term contracts), and it will thus
be able to impose full-line forcing only when compensation - through the ﬁx e df e e-i sn o t
too costly. However, as in Aghion and Bolton, entry will sometimes be deterred when the
entrant is more eﬃcient than the incumbent.
4.3 Welfare Analysis
Let us now the impact of the acquisition of a comprehensive portfolio of varieties on con-
sumers surplus. Any discussion on which criterion competition policy should focus on is far
15beyond the scope of this paper. Since critics of the “portfolio eﬀect” theory often “quote the
Supreme Court in saying that competition law should protect competition, not competitors
(i.e. the only goal of competition law is to ensure that competition beneﬁts consumers)”
(Condomines, 2002), we made the choice to concentrate on consumer surplus rather than on
total welfare. We have already seen that there exist situations in which portfolio of products
can be used to deter entry, and we will now show that consumers (not only competitors)
may well be harmed by this behavior.
If the incumbent produces both varieties and is thus able to deter entry, the outcome will
identical in both periods: consumers pay pM
H (cI,c) for qM
H (cI,c) units of the high-quality
variety and pM
L (cI,c)f o rqM
L (cI,c) units of the low-quality variety.
If the incumbent cannot produce the low-value variety, it is impossible to deter entry in
the ﬁrst period and competition on the high-value segment is increased with probability p.
We then have:
• Entry fails with probability 1−p. In this case, the second period is identical to the
previous case (prices for high- and low-quality varieties are pM
H (cI,c)a n dpM
L (cI,c)r e -
spectively). However, in the ﬁrst period the low-value variety is not eﬃciently produced
(because cE >c ): prices are thus higher (pM
H (cI,c E)a n dpM
L (cI,c E) respectively) and
consumer surplus is thus lower than when entry is deterred.
• On the other hand, entry will be successful with probability p.I fe n t r yi ss u c -
cessful, the active high-quality producer is now more eﬃcient (cE <c I) which decreases
the prices at which both varieties are sold thereby increasing consumer surplus in the
second period. The impact on the ﬁrst period welfare is less straightforward: the con-
sumers have bought qM
H (cI,c E) units of the incumbent’s high-quality variety at price
pM
H (cI,c E) (which is less at a higher price than when entry is deterred) but have also ac-
quired qM
L (cI,c E) units of the entrant’s product at price pM
L (cI,c E). However, because
entry is successful they have realized that this was actually a high-quality product.






eﬀect is not clear, but it seems reasonable to think that it is more likely to be to the
consumers beneﬁt. Entry would then have globally been beneﬁcial for the consumers.
The total impact of the entry deterrence is thus usually ambiguous. Entry deterrence
increases the consumer surplus when it has prevented an unsuccessful entry (probability
1 − p), but is very likely to have a negative impact if entry would have been successful
(probability p). This naturally leads to the following lemma:
Corollary 1 There exists a threshold p ∈ [0,1] such that entry deterrence decreases con-
sumer surplus if and only if p ≥ p.
16This is however not enough to conclude on the impact of the “portfolio of varieties”
because entry deterrence does not occur for any value of p. From proposition 2, it indeed
comes out that entry deterrence occurs only if entry is relatively unlikely to be successful:
p ≤ b p ≡ min
·
πM (cI,c) − πM (cI,c E)




To be able to say anything about the sign of the “portfolio eﬀect” we would need to be
able to compare the two thresholds b p and p, with the result that allowing the incumbent
to acquire the low-quality technology (for example through a merger) would decrease the
consumer surplus whenever p ≤ p ≤ b p.
The problem is that both thresholds are increasing with the entrant’s cost thus making
any comparison virtually impossible in this general setting. We now propose a numerical
example for which demand and cost functions are such that the two varieties are very likely
to constitute two diﬀerent markets. Let us assume that inverse demand functions are linear
and given by:
PH (qH,q L)=7
4 − qH − 1
4qL and PL(qH,q L)=1− qL − 1
4qH,
while the marginal costs are c =0a n dcE = 1
8. Figure 1 shows that there exists a large
range of values of the parameters (cE,p) for which the holder of the portfolio of products
is willing to deter entry thereby harming consumers. This example does not want to claim
that “portfolio eﬀects” always exists but that they might exists and be negative. We will
discuss in a later section the implications of this result for merger analysis.














































Entry is deterred but 
consumer surplus 
increases.
Entry is deterred 
and consumer 
surplus decreases.
Figure 1: “Portfolio Eﬀect” in a linear demand case
175 Alternative Frameworks
Some assumptions of the model might seem very strong and we would now like to discuss
them and see how they could be (at least partially) relaxed.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the assumption that the retailer can carry at most two diﬀerent
products. Although we believe that there exist some reasonable grounds to justify it, it is not
a crucial assumption of the model and can be relatively easily relaxed without signiﬁcantly
aﬀecting the results.
If the retailer can carry as many products as it wants, the incumbent will never be able
to deter entry even it produces both varieties. This is because the retailer has incentives to
sell the entrant’s product even if only an inﬁnitesimal quantity. Because it is not constrained
this can be done together with the two incumbent’s varieties. This would seem to suggest
that our analysis collapses if shelf space is not scarce. This is however due to two important
aspects of our initial model:
(A1) : there is no other cost of entry than the fact that the entrant ﬁrst enters on the low-
value segment on which it is less eﬃcient than the existing ﬁrms (in particular, there
is no ﬁxed cost);
(A2) : it is enough to sell an inﬁnitely small quantity in ﬁr s tp e r i o dt oo b t a i nac h a n c et ob e
a market leader (or high-value variety) in the second period.
The combination of these two hypotheses implies that the entrant and the retailer could
substantially increase their joint proﬁts at (almost) no cost. Relaxing one of them would
already reintroduce a cost of selling the entrant’s product in the ﬁrst period:
(B1): aﬁrst solution consists in relaxing (A1) and assume that there is a ﬁxed cost of F to
be paid by the entrant if it decides to enter market in period one;
(B2) : another possibility would be to assume that the entrant’s product must be suﬃciently
“visible” in the ﬁrst period to have a chance to become a “market-leader” (and thus
compete with the incumbent’s high-value variety). By visible enough, we mean that
entry would only stand a chance to be successful (with probability p) if a minimal
quantity q∗ has been sold in period 1.25
Our results would then be qualitatively restored, if addition to the wholesale tariﬀ,t h e
incumbent can also add an exclusivity clause to the contract that requires the retailer to sell
its product(s) only. In this case, it is important for the incumbent to produce both varieties
because it makes the exclusivity clause more attractive for the retailer: the retailers proﬁt











= p>0o t h e r w i s e .O u r
framework assumes q∗ =0 .
18if it accepts to pay a price FI for the incumbent’s product(s) under an exclusive purchasing
contract would indeed be πM (cI,∅) − FI + πM (∅,c) if the incumbent produces the high-
value variety only, but πM (cI,c) − FI + πM (∅,c) if it produces both. We can again show
that if the “entry cost” (ﬁxed entry cost (F) or extra cost of producing and selling at least
q∗ units of the entrant’s product in the ﬁrst period (equal to at least (cE − c)q∗)) is large
enough, or alternatively the probability of success (p) is low enough, a “portfolio of products”
would help the incumbent to deter entry. It is easy to see that in this case, entry deterrence
can only have a negative impact on consumer surplus: entry does not have any negative
impact on the consumer surplus if it fails because the ﬁrst period prices are not aﬀected,
but a successful entry would increase the consumer surplus in second period since the prices
w o u l dt h e ng od o w n . 26
We would also get similar results adopting a framework inspired by Carlton and Waldman
(2002). Suppose that entry in the high-value (or “primary”) market is possible only in the
second period and only if the entrant has ﬁrst entered the low-value (“secondary” market).
The entry process is thus relatively similar to the one we have used until now assuming that
p = 1 if the entrant has been active in period 1. In that case, even if the entrant has a
cost advantage on the lhigh-quality market (in period 2) and produces the low-quality at
marginal cost c, the incumbent will still be able to deter entry and protect its monopoly
power on the high-quality market using an exclusivity clause (at least when entry costs are
large enough). It is again straightforward to check that the impact of entry deterrence on
consumer surplus is again negative.
The common feature of these frameworks is that by “ﬂooding” the retailer’s shelves
with its products the incumbent can prevent entry on the monopolized market in the long-
term because consumers do not get an opportunity to try new products. This can only be
proﬁtable if the portfolio of brands oﬀered by the incumbent is suﬃciently wide or if the
high-quality brand is very valuable, otherwise the retailer would prefer to take the risk of
removing the incumbent’s products of its shelves to favor entry.
Finally, an important feature of our model is the structure of the retail market. Since
this market is monopolized, the unique retailer plays an important role in preventing the
incumbent manufacturer to use its portfolio in order to prevent eﬃcient entry. The existence
of buyer power will limit the impact of “portfolio power” to situation in which the entrant
is not too eﬃcient. The results are likely to be diﬀerent if the retail market was to be more
competitive. Let us for think of what is likely to happen if the producers compete directly
for consumers. In this case, a portfolio of product could be used to make “predation” more







E. Once again results would be qualitatively similar at the expense of a much “heavier” analysis.
19eﬃcient. If the incumbent could for example sell its low-value variety below cost in order to
make entry more diﬃcult. This would at the same time allow it to reduces the distortions
that it has to impose on the price of the hihg-value variety to deter entry. Because it has
now two tools (its two prices), the incumbent is likely to deter entry much more easily when
it holds the two varieties.
6 Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
In 1997, Guinness Plc.a n dGrand Metropolitan Plc. notiﬁed their intention to merge and
form GMG Brands (now called Diageo). The case was investigated by the U.S. Federal
Trade Commission and the European Commission (DG IV). The merger was allowed but
the parties had agreed inter alia to terminate some distribution agreements and to divest
some of their brands.
The merger brought together two complementary portfolios of brands: Guinness was
at the time a producer and distributor of spirits worldwide that controlled renowned spirit
brands. Guinness was strong on the gin market but relatively weak on the vodka market.
Grand Metropolitan was involved in large number of business among which the distribution
of wine and spirits. GrandMet was particularly strong on the vodka market but weak on the
gin market, so that the two portfolios of brands were perfectly complementary.27
The Commission determined that every single type of spirit constituted a separate prod-
uct market, and that, because tastes diﬀer from country to country and the distribution
of spirit was organized at a national level, the relevant geographic markets were national.
In this sense, the market share in most of the individual markets was not increased by the
merger, one ﬁrm being strong where the other was weak. However, despite this lack of
increase in market share, the Commission was concerned that the creation of a very large
portfolio including an important number of leading brands could in itself create or strengthen
a dominant position. The Commission was particularly concerned with this potential port-
folio power because the products were usually sold to a common buyer (usually a large retail
chain) who buys a range of products.
Among other issues raised by the Commission, two points seem to be relevant for the
theory exposed in this paper:
1. There would be greater potential for tying product (full-line forcing).
2. The threat of a refusal to supply would be more potent.
The rationale behind this analysis is that the holder of a comprehensive portfolio of
products could force the retailers (or the bar / pub chains for on-trade sales) to buy the
27Note that production and distribution of wine and spirits is the main activity (in terms of revenues) of
the new entity.
20whole range of products thereby raising barriers to entry. In its detailed analysis of the case,
Nalebuﬀ (2003) identiﬁes two ways in which such barriers could arise: ﬁrstly, “a new entrant
would need to develop a range of desirable products in order to counter the portfolio power of
the merger company”. Moreover, because brand name is a important feature of the spirits
markets, there would be signiﬁcant entry costs because a new comer would need to promote
its brand heavily to encourage the retailers to carry it.
The results presented in this paper seem to be consistent with this approach of the
“portfolio eﬀects”. We indeed abstract from potential eﬃciency arguments28 to focus on the
potential entry deterrence aspects. We have shown in this paper that, even when the retailer
has buyer power (which seems to be the case in the GMG case at least for oﬀ-trade sales
made through large retail chains29), a portfolio of brands can be used to reduce the space
available in the retailer’s shelves which makes entry virtually impossible. As suggested by
the Commission’s decision, this will be achieved through vertical restraints (e.g. full-line
forcing or exclusive dealing). Even though the retailer would in general favor entry because
it beneﬁts from more competition between the brands, the holder of a large portfolio of
products which includes a leading brand (the monopolized high-quality variety in our model)
can prevent entry through full-line forcing because the retailer cannot aﬀord not to propose
the leading brand in its shelves. We have also shown that in this type of situation, the impact
on consumer surplus might be negative even when the degree of substitutability between the
products is relatively small. This suggests that the analysis of this type of mergers cannot
be limited to the computation of the diﬀe r e n tm a r k e ts h a r e so rt h eH e r ﬁndhal index (and
thus to the deﬁnition of the product and geographic markets).
We do not want to claim that any merger that creates a large portfolio of products
should be prohibited per se but simply that the Commission theory that “the market power
deriving from a portfolio of brands exceeds the sum of its parts” has some rationale. As
our analysis suggest, this type of more detailed analysis should be carried out even when
the market shares on the identiﬁed product markets do not increase. Attention should be
given to such mergers whenever the competition authority have identiﬁed brand names has
being an important feature of the market.30 As our analysis suggest full-line forcing is more
likely to occur when the threat of refusal to supply is serious, that is, whenever a retailer
cannot aﬀord not to carry a brand. This will be the case when the merged entity owns
28The merger could induce two types of eﬀciencies: ﬁrstly, economies of scale and scope would mean that
a larger portfolio of brands is likely to reduce the costs. Moreover, if there are ﬁxed negotiation costs, a
retailer would save costs by dealing with only one producer rather than two.
29According to Nalebuﬀ (2003) there are also important barriers to entry created by the importance of
on-trade sales: because “the on-trade industry is more fragmented (...), direct distribution to the on-trade
would be extremely costly for the new entrant.”
30This was for example the case in the GMG merger case. A relatively similar analysis was made by the
French competition authorities in the C o c a - C o l a/O r a n g i n acase.
21particularly strong brands. In these cases, the authorities should identify whether entry is
particularly diﬃcult for a new entrant in the sense that it has to convince both the retailer
and the consumers about its product. Speciﬁc attention should be given if the retailers’
shelves can be considered as an essential facility: if this is the case the holder of a large
portfolio of products could easily try to prevent entry by blocking the access to these shelves
by “ﬂooding” with its secondary brands. Deep portfolios of brands can thus be seen as a
threat to competition.
Although we do agree with Nalebuﬀ (2003) that it is not the merger in itself that has
anti-competitive eﬀects, we do not believe that the appropriate solution is always to focus
on behavioral (preventing bundling strategies) rather than structural remedies (divestiture
of brands). The decision should rather be taken on a case by case basis and structural
approaches should in our view be favored if the pro-competitive eﬀects of the merger (cost
eﬃciencies, ...) do not appear to be large. Once the merger has been agreed, it is very
diﬃcult and costly for competition authorities to monitor the behavior of the new entity.
Providing an exhaustive analysis of the unifying economic theory of “portfolio eﬀects” was
far beyond the scope of this paper. We believe however that it provides a useful counter-
argument to the view that this theory cannot have any economic foundations, and that,
although tying might have anti-competitive eﬀects, it cannot be proﬁtably used in equilib-
rium. We think that our results conﬁrm that “portfolio power” may arise and have harmful
eﬀects for the consumers and should therefore be analyzed in detail when it appears to be
necessary.
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24AP r o o f o f L e m m a 3
In order to deter entry, the incumbent has to ensure that the retailer is never willing to
accept the entrant’s oﬀer and sell its product (even in inﬁnitesimal quantity), and this even
if the entrant is ready to give its technology to the retailer for free (or alternatively is ready
to sell its good at marginal cost over the two periods).
This imply that the incumbent has to convince the retailer to distribute its high-value
variety along with the competitive fringe’s low-value variety. It would indeed be impossible to
convince to sell only the high-value variety or a low-value variety from one of the competitive
producers: the retailer would always be better oﬀ using its second shelf slot to store the
entrant’s product even if it ends up selling only inﬁnitely small quantity of it. For this to
happen, the incumbent needs to oﬀer a wholesale contract such that the following constraint
is met:
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implying that the arguments of the min function the left-hand term of equation (2) are
both increasing in wI. This is equivalent to say that the (ﬁrst period) beneﬁt of selling the
competitively produced low-value variety rather than the entrant’s product is larger when
the incumbent’s high-value variety is more expensive. To deter entry, the incumbent will
therefore over-price its high-value variety as much as possible (i.e. such that the retailer
accepts the incumbent’s oﬀer but does not actually sell the product - or sells in inﬁnitely
small quantity). This is in some sense equivalent to say that the incumbent pays the retailer
not to carry the entrant’s product, although this means that its own product is not sold.
Entry deterrence is thus possible if and only if:
π
M (∅,c) − π
M (∅,c E) ≥ p
¡
π




and this would contradict the assumption (H2).
25B Proof of Proposition 1
The ﬁxed fees FI and FE set respectively by the incumbent and the entrant have to satisfy
the following constraints:
π








M (cI,c) − FI + π
M (∅,c)( 3 )
... ≥ π










M (∅,c)( 5 )
Conditions (3) and (4) determine the maximum franchises the producers can charge, that is:
FI ≤ π
M (cI,c E) − π
M (∅,c E)a n dFE ≤ π




In both cases, the maximum fee is equal to the manufacturer’s contribution to the retailer’s
proﬁts. If these two constraints were to be binding, the third condition (5) would be satisﬁed
if and only if:
π
M(cI,c E) − π
M(∅,c E) ≤ π
M(cI,c) − π
M(∅,c). (6)






Since cE is larger than c,( 6 )c a n n o tb es a t i s ﬁed and (5) is therefore binding. The franchise
fees must then satisfy the following three conditions:
FI + FE = π





M (cI,c E) − π
M (∅,c E)( 8 )
FE ≤ π




The incumbent makes the ﬁrst oﬀer and can therefore set its franchise fee such that the
constraint (8) is binding. The entrant then sets its fee in order to satisfy the condition (7).
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